Immigration is today one of the most hotly debated policy issues in the United States. Despite marked divergence of opinion even within political parties, several important reforms have been introduced in the post 1965 era. The purpose of this paper is to carry out a systematic analysis of the drivers of the voting behavior of US representatives on immigration policy in the period 1970-2006, and in particular to assess the role of economic factors at the district level. Our findings suggest that representatives from more skilled labor abundant districts are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the unskilled, whereas the opposite is true for representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts. This evidence is robust to the introduction of an array of additional economic and non-economic characteristics of the districts, and suggests that a simple factor analysis model can go a long way in explaining the voting behavior on immigration policy. JEL Classification: F22, J61
Introduction
Immigration and immigration policy have been among the most hotly debated policy issues in the United States ever since independence (Hatton and Williamson 2005) , and recent evidence suggests that views on immigration continue to differ greatly among the public (Scheve and Slaughter 2001 , Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2007 , Mayda 2006 . Interestingly, vastly heterogeneous opinions can be found also within -supposedly more homogeneous -political parties. For instance, in reporting on the debate spurred by the immigration policy reform proposal introduced in 2005, many commentators have highlighted the divisiveness of the issue. Watanabe and Becerra (2006) suggest that "The Republican Party is split among those who want tougher restrictions, those who fear alienating the Latino vote and business owners who are pressing for more laborers to fill blue collar jobs in construction, cleaning, gardening and other industries." At the same time, whereas in the recent past the platform of the Democratic Party has been pro-immigration, many Democratic constituencies have shown concerns with the increased inflows of foreigners. In particular, US labor unions have traditionally opposed growing inflows of foreign workers 1 -and much of their rank and files continue to do so -even if they now officially welcome Latinos and other immigrants. In carrying out our analysis, we focus on the role played by the economic drivers of the voting decision and, in particular, by the labor market characteristics of a constituency. To frame our question, we start by developing a simple theoretical model in which heterogeneous districts differ in their relative endowment of skilled and unskilled labor. By changing factor supplies, immigration affects factor income, thus creating winners and losers. 2 An elected politician chooses to support or not an immigration policy initiative depending on whether or not it increases the constituency's weighted average welfare. The model suggests thatceteris 1 See Watts (2002) . 2 See Berry and Soligo (1969) . Empirical evidence on the effect of immigration on wages is more controversial. In particular, Borjas (2003 Borjas ( , 2006 finds robust evidence on the adverse effect of immigration on natives workers' wages, whereas Card (2009) , Ottaviano and Peri (2008) among others, find a much smallerand often not significant effect.
3 paribusan elected representative is more likely to favor an open policy towards unskilled immigrants the more skilled labor abundant his district is.
We assess the predictions of our stylized model using a novel dataset we have constructed.
Our data cover all individual recorded votes on immigration policy measures affecting the supply of unskilled immigrants, which have been introduced in the US House of Representatives over the period . Individual level voting decisions are then complemented with a wealth of district level characteristics, covering both economic and noneconomic drivers of individual voting decisions.
Our empirical analysis suggests that labor market characteristicsas captured by district level factor endowments -are statistically significant drivers of a representative's voting behavior on immigration policy. In particular, we find that representatives from more skilled labor abundant districts are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the unskilled, while representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts are less likely to do so. Quantitatively, the effects we find are important: an increase by one percentage point in the share of skilled workers in a district leads to approximately a one percentage point increase in the probability that the district representative will support a bill liberalizing unskilled immigration.
Besides the labor market characteristics of the district, the literature has suggested that other factors may affect voting behavior. Thus, to assess the robustness of our findings, we explore the role played by additional economic characteristics, by political/ideological drivers, and by ethnic features of the district. While several of these channels do play a role in shaping voting behavior on immigration, our main results are unaffected. The expected labor market impact of immigration is a robust driver of decision making on immigration policy matters.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper represents the most comprehensive attempt to date to systematically investigate the role of economic and non-economic drivers on immigration policy voting behavior in the post 1965 era. It is also the only one that directly exploit differences in factor endowments across districts to capture the extent of expected labor market competition brought about by new, unskilled, immigration.
The congressional politics of immigration policy has been the subject of an extensive array of previous studies. Gimpel and Edwards (1999) , in their very comprehensive work on immigration policy making, analyze a variety of individual bills, but pay little or no attention at all towards district level economic determinants. Goldin's (1994) study of the introduction of the literacy test provision is instead one of the pioneering contributions in the economics literature. Several other papers in this tradition have focused on single or a narrow set of legislative initiatives. For instance, Gonzalez and Kamdar (2000) have analyzed the 1996 Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (H.R. 2202) and have found that representative of district characterized by a higher share of workers employed in low-skill intensive industries tended to be more in favor of immigration restrictions. Fetzer (2006) found a similar result in his analysis of the voting on H.R. 4437 during the 109 th Congress, but looking at the distribution of individuals across occupations in a given district. 3 Bananian, Bodvarsson and Lowenberg (2006) -following a similar approach -have considered instead four important bills introduced between 1980 and 1996, and have focused on the role played by sectoral employment in shaping voting behavior. Besides covering a larger sample of votes, our analysis has the advantage of focusing on a direct measure of the educational achievement at the district level, which is less likely to react in the short run to changes in immigration policy at the national level.
An interesting, recent study by Milner and Tingley (2009) is the contribution in the literature that comes closest to ours in scope. The authors analyze a large panel of votes on immigration policy related issues which took place in the US Congress between 1979 and 2003, and explore the role of both economic and non-economic drivers of individual representatives' choices. Importantly, their analysis differ from ours in several key dimensions, involving both the data used and the methodology followed to carry out the study. First of all, our sample covers a longer time period. Secondly, Milner and Tingley (2009) include in their analysis all votes on migrationboth on final passage bills and on intermediate legislative steps 4 -and also votes on immigration bills that are not expected to directly affect the labor supply in the United States. Our focus is instead narrower, as on the one hand we consider only those bills, which -as the literature has argueddirectly impact the domestic labor supply. Furthermore, we focus exclusively on final passage bills, as expectations on the effects at the district level of floor amendments are less clear than for final passage votes. Third, Milner and Tingley use the share of individuals working in highly skilled jobs 5 as the key proxy for the district's labor market characteristics, whereas we use a more fundamental measure, which is based directly 5 on educational attainment at the district level. Interestinglyand differently from our analysis, they find only limited support for the role played by the labor market channel in shaping voting behavior.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent developments in the congressional history of US immigration policy. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model, which drives our empirical investigation. Section 4 describes our data, while section 5 presents our empirical results. In section 6 we carry out a series of robustness checks, and section 7 concludes the paper.
A short overview of recent US Migration Policy
The votes included in our sample span over the years 1970-2006, a period during which the United States has seen immigration levels soaring and immigration policy becoming once again the focus of much debate. In this section we provide a brief overview of the main policy initiatives which have been introduced in this period, and highlight their impact on unskilled immigration. For a summary of the bills introduced in this period, see Table 1 .
1970-1980
The US migration policy in the seventies was characterized by the introduction of a series of amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which had abolished the national-origin quota system and replaced it with a system emphasizing the importance of family ties and as a result had greatly simplified the family reunification process.
Parallel with this shift in the immigrants channel of entry, economic conditions changed substantially. At the beginning of the seventies the US economy was hit by the first oil crisis and suffered from stagflation -high unemployment combined with high inflation. The US Congress reacted to this development by introducing a series of restrictive immigration policy measures. This change in attitude is already reflected in H.R. 392 and H.R. 891, which passed the House of Representatives in 1973 with a clear majority. While the first bill contains provisions for employer sanctions to tackle the growing employment of undocumented immigrants, the second bill extended the applicability of the 20,000 per-country cap to migrants from the Western hemisphere contained in the 1965 act. This measure was particularly aimed at limiting immigration from Mexico (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . 6 6 In the following years the dominant issue became the admission of refugees. The debate concerned mainly the distinction between immigrants and refugees, the annual limit for refugees, the scope for resettlement assistance, language and vocational training, and medical care for newly arrived refugees. 7
1980-1990
Following the introduction of restrictive measures on immigration from the Western hemisphere and the growing arrivals of refugees, much of the policy debate during the eighties focused on the strong increase in the numbers of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers, especially from Haiti, El-Salvador and Cuba (Tichenor 1994 During the 97 th congress senator Alan Simpson (Republican, Wyoming) and congressman Romano Mazzoli (Democrat, Kentucky) took the initiative to introduce an important reform of the US immigration legislation. One major provision of the bill was to make it illegal to knowingly hire or recruit undocumented immigrants, and the proposed legislation introduced also financial and other penalties for those employing illegal aliens. A second major component was the requirement for employers to attest their employees' immigration status.
Last but not least, the proposed legislation granted an amnesty to certain agricultural seasonal workers and immigrants who entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and had lived in the US continuously ever since. The bill proposal was -from its very introduction on the Senate floor in 1982 -very controversial. The introduction of sanctions for employers drew strong opposition from liberal democrats, business groups and the Hispanic Caucus. Furthermore, the House leadership did not favor the idea of such a controversial bill reaching the floor for final voting in an election year. For these reasons Mazzoli decided finally to pull 7 The general distinction between refugees and immigrants is that the latter group leaves their country voluntarily, while the first group has to leave their country due to religious or political persecution (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . 8 Refugees and asylum seekers usually do not gain immediately access to the host country's labor market. Furthermore, "warm glow" is likely to play an important role in shaping the voting behavior on policy measures towards refugees and asylum seekers (see Hatton 2004, Hatton and Williamson 2005) . the bill from the floor and to reintroduce it in the 98 th congress (Lowell et al. 1986, Gimpel and Edwards 1999) .
The leadership structure in the House remained nearly unchanged in the 98 th congress and the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill faced again considerable controversy. After passing the different subcommittees, House floor action saw the consideration of 69 amendments. Most of the debate focused on the employer sanctions and the amnesty provisions. In particular, it was feared that the latter provision would have a dramatic impact on the numbers of immigrants that would be admitted in the US, because legalized immigrants were to be allowed to bring their relatives under the 1965 preference system (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . After much debate, the bill passed the House with a 216 to 211 vote, with a margin of only five votes, one of the narrowest in the whole immigration debate. Since the bill passed the Senate in a different version, the two texts went to a House-Senate conference committee, where they died as no compromise could be reached.
The push for a comprehensive immigration reform was strong enough for a new version of the bill to be introduced in the 99 th congress in both chambers. The main difference from the original proposal was the addition of a temporary program for agricultural workers, which was requested by the agricultural lobby and strongly opposed by organized labor (Gimpel & Edwards 1999) . The new version of the bill finally passed both chambers and was enacted on November 6, 1986 by President Reagan. The direction of the policy change brought about by the bill is not straightforward to assess, due to the variety of different provisions contained in the legislation. Two features of IRCA appear to be prominent though. First, it allowed almost 3.5 million illegal immigrants to be legalized as permanent immigrants (LeMay 2006) . Furthermore, the bill implemented a controversial guest-worker initiative in the tradition of the Bracero program, which enabled a legal temporary inflow of unskilled farm workers. For these reason, and following also Tichenor (1994) , we have classified the IRCA as being pro immigration. Since the restrictionist impetus was much clearer in the original Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, we have followed the literature and classified it as being against immigration liberalization. 9
The other measure included in our analysis was aimed at a more generous handling of illegal immigrants and in particular H.R. 4222 extended the legalization provisions of the IRCA act by six months. 10 8
1990-2000
The first major legislation of this period was the Immigration Act of 1990 (IMMACT). In contrast to IRCA, this bill focused mainly on legal immigration and had two main goals: the revision of the existing visa allocation system and the introduction of new provisions for skilled immigration. The system based on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 heavily emphasized family reunification and in particular it excluded immediate relatives from the annual immigration cap. As a consequence, the number and share of European immigrants had steadily decreased during the previous two decades, while the numbers of visas issued to immigrants of Asian and Latin American descent had increased dramatically.
For this reason the IMMACT established a new preference scheme with three categories:
family-based immigration (approximately 74% of total), employment and business related immigration (20 percent of total) and a new diversity category (6 percent of total). Under the second category, people are admitted on the basis of skills and occupations, while the third category allocates green cards through a lottery program. The goal of the last category is to increase the number of immigrants from countries, which previously had a low number of admissions. In practice, the role of family reunification and labor market shortages driven immigration was not altered substantially (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) . The major change introduced by the legislation was the increase of the annual cap for legal permanent residents from approximately 500,000 to 700,000. Finally, the act established also a short-term amnesty program to grant legal residence to up to 165,000 spouses and minor children of immigrants, who were legalized under the IRCA.
As it soon became apparent, the IRCA had failed to stem the problem of undocumented immigrants entering the US. This increased the pressure on US policy makers to deal with illegal immigration. One result was the introduction, in 1994, of the so-called Proposition 187 in California. 11 The proposition prevented illegal immigrants from having access to most public services, including public education, and was approved in a referendum by almost 60% of those entitled to vote. The measure became state law, but it was later ruled unconstitutional by a federal court. Still, the message to Congress was clear and the Californian delegation was very active in trying to put immigration reform high on Congress' agenda (Gimpel and Edwards 1999, Le May 2006) . A result of this initiative and of the following debates is the second major immigration legislation of the nineties: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (H. R. 2202) of 1996. Initially, the act increased the size of the U.S. Border Patrol to 10,000 agents over five years and mandated the construction of fences at the most heavily trafficked areas of the U.S.-Mexico border. Furthermore, the bill introduced a pilot program to check the immigration status of job applicants. A third and very important provision made the deportation of illegal immigrants substantially easier.
Previously, immediate deportation was triggered only for offences that could lead to five years or more in jail. Under the new act, minor offences such as shoplifting, were making an individual eligible for deportation. Last but not least the law restricted the federal benefits to illegal and legal migrants (e.g. an alien who is not lawfully present in the U.S. is ineligible for social security benefits). The bill entered into force on September 30, 1996.
2000-present
The immigration policy in the recent years has been mainly influenced by concerns about illegal immigration and national security. The facts of September 11, 2001 and the fear of additional terrorist attacks have been very powerful catalysts, which have led Congress to adopt a number of new measures on immigration. In line with this, all of the bills from this period which are included in our analysis (H. R. 4437, H.R. 418, H.R. 4830, H.R. 6094, H.R. 6061, and H.R. 6095 ) are aimed at reducing illegal immigration and at tightening immigration law enforcement.
The most controversial and substantial legislative proposal was the Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (H.R. 4437). One of the major provisions of the bill was the building of a fence along the US-Mexican border up to 700 miles (1120 km) long, at points with the highest number of illegal border crossings. Secondly, the act required the federal government to take custody of undocumented aliens detained by local authorities. This would put an end to the practice of "catch and release", whereby federal officials instructed local law enforcement officers to release detained undocumented aliens due to a lack of resources. Furthermore, the act would have introduced a fine of $3,000 to all undocumented aliens, who were captured in the US and had previously agreed to leave the country voluntarily. Finally, the bill would have subjected a person who supports or hosts undocumented immigrant to up to five years in prison (Fetzer 2006 shall be made to end the practice of "catch and release".
Theoretical framework
To analyze the drivers of the voting behavior of individual representatives, we consider a simple model with D heterogeneous districts. Each district is populated by low skilled and high skilled individuals -and we assume the supply of each production factor to be potentially heterogeneous across agents. District i is populated by Li N low skilled agents and Hi N high skilled ones, so that the total population is given by (1)
Two alternative policy options are available to the representative: maintaining the status quo, or adopting a measure that will change the human capital -labor ratio in the population. This simple setting captures the main features of our data, from which we have information on whether a congressman votes in favor or against a policy that increases the relative supply of unskilled labor.
The main result of our analysis can be summarized in the following Proposition 1 The likelihood that a representative will support a more open migration policy towards the more (less) skilled is increasing in the share of the low (highly) skilled in the district's population.
Proof: From equation (1) and the factor market equilibrium conditions, we know
, which establishes the result.
As long as the relative weight attached to skilled labor in the objective function of the politician is lower than the relative supply of skilled labor in the district ( ), an increase (decrease) in the skilled labor supply is viewed favorably (negatively) by the politician. Across jurisdictions, a district with a higher share of low (highly) skilled in the 12 population is more (less) likely to favor an inflow of skilled immigrants. The working of proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 , and represents the main prediction we will assess in our empirical analysis 
Data and summary statistics
The data for our analysis comes from various sources. We start by using the Congressional Roll Call Voting Dataset of the Policy Agenda Project and the Library of Congress (THOMAS) to identify and collect information on all legislative votes in the US House of Representatives which are related to immigration issues between 1970 and 2006. Roll call votes are recorded votes that enable to observe individual voting behavior of House representatives on single bills and amendments. 13 Since both data bases provide only rough information about the content of the bills, we have supplemented them using additional 13 resources, like the Congressional Quarterly publications and existing historical accounts like the one by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) , to identify immigration related bills. In the second step, we use the full text of the legislation to classify the bills into four categories according to their main topic: general immigration, illegal migration, refugees and asylum, and naturalization and integration. We restrict our analysis to bills belonging to the first two categories, because those are the ones most directly linked to the inflow of foreign labor.
Furthermore, in our analysis we concentrate on bills with a potential impact on the supply of unskilled labor. In particular, for the purpose of our analysis an immigration bill is a piece of legislation that can have either a direct positive or negative impact on the size of the unskilled labor force in the US if it would come into force. We therefore excludefor instance -bills that deal primarily with the provision of public goods to illegal migrants or federal reimbursement of health and education costs to states. Finally, we focus on final passage votes, which determine whether a bill passes the House or not. In doing so, we exclude votes on amendments which take place during the decision process on the House floor. 14 We have decided to follow this strategy, because the expectations on the effects of floor amendments are less clear than for final passage votes. Voting on amendments is likely to be connected to strategic voting and therefore is less likely to distinctly reflect the interests of the legislator's constituency. 15 Table 1 illustrates votes on immigration legislation that took place in the US House of Representatives between 1970 and 2006, which satisfy the criteria discussed above and therefore constitute the basis of our empirical analysis. As it can be easily seen, most of the votes are relatively close, and this reflects the controversial nature of immigration policy in the United States. For detailed information on the content of the various bills and their role in the history of US immigration policy, see the discussion in section 2.
Next, we combine our data on immigration bills with the corresponding records of individual voting behavior of House representatives. This information is provided by the VOTEVIEW project (http://voteview.ucsd.edu) of Poole and Rosenthal (1997) , which offers data on US congressmen voting behavior from 1798 to the present. In addition to this, the VOTEVIEW database contains a number of variables like the name of congressman, his party affiliation, state, and congressional district that enable us to distinctly identify the legislators and link them to their constituency. Finally, we combine our data on individual voting records with information on the economic and non-economic characteristics of electoral constituencies. For this we use mainly Census data. However, for the period 1970 to 1990 the US Census bureau provides no information at the district level. For this period we instead use data from the Congressional District Data Files of Adler (2003) and Lublin (1997) , who have aggregated Census data at the congressional district level taking into account the decennial redistricting. 16 Our dependent variable is the representative's voting behavior on immigration bills Vote ijt In the case of bills liberalizing immigration a vote coded 1 indicates that the district representative votes in favor of more open immigration and 0 otherwise. In the case of legislations restricting immigration a vote is coded 0 if the representative's vote is in favor of restricting immigration and 1 otherwise. The main explanatory variable of interest in our analysis is the skill ratio of a congressional district, SkillRatio it , which is measured as the ratio of high-skilled individuals over 25 to total population over 25 at time t in congressional district i. High-skilled individuals are defined as those having earned at least a bachelor degree. According to our theoretical model we expect that the likelihood to vote in favor of liberalizing the immigration of unskilled workers increases with the share of the highly skilled population at working age.
Further economic controls at the district level are unemployment and the share of farm workers. We define unemployment as the share of unemployed individuals as a percentage of the total labor force. The share of farm workers, measured as the number of farm workers relatively to the total labor force, proxies for the size of the agricultural sector within a congressional district. Moreover, we also control for the industrial structure of a district by including the share of individuals employed in manufacturing, construction and wholesale and retail in the total labor force. To capture the role of welfare state drivers, we use the median family income of a congressional district.
Furthermore, we include a number of explanatory variables providing information on the ideological characteristics of the representative/district. In particular, we capture the ideological orientation of a representative by looking at his/her party affiliation and at the first dimension of the DW nominate score. 17 This index is provided by the VOTEVIEW project (http://voteview.ucsd.edu) and increases in congressman's conservatism. As an alternative, we also use the ADA score, which evaluates every congressman on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher scores assigned to more liberal politicians. 18 The latter is constructed by the American for Democratic Action, a lobby group, and the main difference with the DW nominate score is that it uses only votes on a subsample of bills, whereas the DW nominate score makes use of every roll call votes in each congress, and is based on a more sophisticated estimation procedure. Furthermore, we use the share of Democratic votes in the past election as a proxy for the ideological orientation of a congressional district. 19 As additional controls we included also information on the political affiliation of the House majority and of the US President.
Finally, we consider data on contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) which comes from the Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/).
To study the role of immigrant networks and additional ethnic characteristics of the district, we use Census data, and measure the share of foreign-born, Afro-Americans and Hispanics in a district's population. By controlling for the change in the share of the foreign born population over time we account for the possibility that recent inflows of migrants might affect congressmen' preferences towards prospective immigration differently than the existing stock of foreign workers. Furthermore, we incorporate the ethnic background of congressmen by controlling whether a congressman is of Afro-American or Hispanic descent. These data is Finally, we explore also the additional role played by geography in shaping voting on immigration policy. To this end, we include the share of the population living in urban areas, to capture potential differences in attitudes towards immigration between rural and urban areas. We further investigate cross-state differences in voting on immigration bills by running separate regressions for congressmen from South-Western and high immigration states. 17 The second dimension of the DW score measures for our observation period the conflict about civil rights for African-Americans. 18 The ADA score is calculated annually on the basis of 20 selected key votes on a wide range of social and economic issues, both domestic and international. The selection is made by the ADA`s legislative committee without providing clear selection criteria. From the bills included in our analyses no one has been used for the construction of the ADA score. 19 Data on share of Democratic votes comes from Lee et al. (2004) and for the 109th congress from Chandler et al. (2008) . Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables we have described above. Over the entire observation period, 36% of the representatives voted in favor of freer immigration.
However Control Act (H.R. 4437) introduced during the 109 th congress. In Figure 2 , on the other hand, we use census data to construct the district level share of highly skilled in the population. As it can be easily seen, almost all congressmen who supported less restrictive immigration legislation represented districts with skill ratios above average. 21 However, the figure illustrates also that not all representatives from districts with high skill ratios voted in favor of a liberal immigration policy. This highlights the necessity to systematically control for additional economic and non-economic characteristics of the constituencies, and we will do so in the next section.
Empirical Analysis
As the theoretical model suggests, the voting behavior of an individual representative on a migration policy bill aimed at expanding the inflow of unskilled workers is a function of the Table 3 contains our main specifications. Our initial set of regressions (columns 1-3) focuses on the effects of economic drivers that work through the labor market. As suggested by our theoretical model, we find that labor market complementarities are important: Representatives from districts where the share of skilled workers in the population is higher are more likely to support immigration policies aimed at increasing the supply of unskilled workers. This finding is robust and holds throughout our specificationsonce we include additional district level controls.
Furthermore, column (2) indicates a positive relationship between a district's unemployment rate and voting on liberalizing low-skilled immigration. As it will turn out, this findingwhich is somewhat counterintuitive but common in the literature (see for instance Gimpel and Edwards 1999)is likely to be due to an omitted variable bias (see column 11).
To control for the importance of the sectoral dimension of employment, the role of which has been emphasized for instance by Gonzalez and Kamdra (2006) , we also include the share of workers employed in agriculture (column 3). A priori, the sign of the correlation between the importance of agriculture and voting behavior on migration policies favoring the unskilled is ambiguous. On the one hand, as unskilled (and illegal) migrants are very likely to end up working in agriculture Spilimbergo 1999, 2001) , we expect them to compete with native workers in that sector, and the larger is the share of domestic workers employed in agriculture in a given district, the less likely the district representative will be to support open migration policies. On the other hand, the more important is agriculture in the economy of a given district, the more likely it is that interest groups representing this sector will be able to convince politicians that they need an abundant labor supply (possibly made up by immigrant workers) to keep agriculture competitive. Empirically, we find that the share of farm workers is negatively correlated with the likelihood to vote in favor of immigration liberalization, but the result we find in column (3), as we will discuss later on, does not turn out to be robust.
In the second set of regressions (column 4), we capture instead the role of the welfare state.
There is an abundant literature highlighting the importance of this channel in shaping individual-level attitudes towards immigration (Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter 2007 , Dustmann and Preston 2007 , Facchini and Mayda 2009 , and thus we expect the welfare state to be also an important driver of individual representatives' voting behavior. In particular, in the presence of cross-district redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we expect richer constituencies to be less favorable towards unskilled immigration, as unskilled immigrants are net receivers of benefits from the welfare state.
Our findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations. Representatives of richer districts are substantially less likely to support unskilled immigration (column 4), and this result is very robust to the introduction of additional controls (column 5-11). 23
The third channel we consider, whose importance has also been highlighted in the literature (Gimpel and Edwards 1999) , is the political/ideological channel. First, we control for the representative's party affiliation. We find that belonging to the Democratic Party is positively and significantly correlated with the likelihood of voting in favor of immigration liberalization (column 5 of Table 3 ). This result is in line with earlier findings by Gimpel and Edwards (1999) , who conclude that "recorded votes on immigration policy have become more partisan over time, even after controlling for alternative influences on congressional decision making such as region and constituency characteristics." 24 Interestingly, it is worth noticing that accounting for the representative's party affiliation substantially reduces the effect of the share of farm workers on the congressman voting behavior, reducing its magnitude. This suggests that the results in columns (3) through (4) were driven by an omitted variable bias.
Indeed, district characterized by a higher employment share in agriculture tend also to be more conservative, and without controlling for ideology the sectoral composition effect was confounded with the ideological dimension.
An elected representative's party affiliation is only an imprecise proxy for a district's partisan leaning, as it has been recently argued for instance by Lee et al. (2004) . For this reason, in column 6 we also control for the extent of party strength in the previous election.
Interestingly, we find that representatives of districts with a higher share of Democratic votes in the last congressional election are more likely to support legislations liberalizing immigration.
In the last five columns of Table 3 (specifications 7-11) we examine the role of what we name the geographic and network channels. It is well known that migrants tend to concentrate in urban areas (Card 2009 ) and thus it is important to understand whether congressmen elected in more urban constituencies vote differently from those elected in more rural areas. The result in column (7) suggests that the likelihood of congressmen to support more open immigration policies towards unskilled labor increases with the share of the population living in urban areas. Importantly, our findings in column (8) highlight that representatives of districts with a higher share of foreign-born are more likely to vote in favor of liberalizing unskilled immigration. There are at least two possible explanations for why existing immigrants might have a preference for liberalizing immigration even if they are likely to end up competing in the labor market with the new immigrants: social and family networks, and identification with minorities. In the first case, individuals prefer freer immigration because it helps relatives and friends from abroad to enter the USthis channel has been found to be very important also in the labor market (Munshi 2003) . The second channel refers instead to the situation in which previous immigrants identify with new immigrants due to their own immigration experience.
To assess the effects of shocks to the demographic composition of a district, in column (9) we also control for the growth rate in the share of foreign born (Money 1997) . Interestingly, we 20 find that recent spikes in the share of foreign born are negatively correlated with the probability of congressmen to support immigration liberalization, even though the results are not statistically significant.
Finally, in column (10) and (11) we assess the role played by the racial composition of the district, focusing on the importance of the share of Hispanics and African-Americans. While we don't find a significant relationship between congressmen's voting behavior and the share of Hispanics in the population, the positive and significant coefficient for Afro-American suggests that the identification with minorities might be important. 25 Indeed, there is some evidence suggesting that African American legislators tend to see the immigration issue within a minority rights framework. Based on the ideas of civil rights and equal opportunity they build political coalitions with other ethnic minorities and tend to support open immigration policies (Gimpel and Edwards 1999 , Gonzales and Kamdar 2000 , Fetzer 2006 ).
Interestingly, accounting for the share of African American in the population makes the unemployment rate statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This suggests that our previous findings were driven by an omitted variable bias: Afro-Americans are more likely to be unemployed, and representatives of districts with a high share of Afro-Americans are more
likely to support open immigration policies. 26
To conclude, the results in Table 3 provide strong support for the predictions of our simple theoretical model. Congressmen's are more likely to support measures increasing the availability of unskilled labor the higher is the share of high skilled workers in a given district.
This result is robust to the introduction of additional economic channelslike the welfare state channel, and other non-economic channels, like the political/ideological channel and additional geographic/network controls which affect legislators voting behavior.
Robustness checks
In this section we assess the robustness of our main results in a number of ways. We start by considering in Table 4 alternative for the impact of other district characteristics are similar to the ones in our preferred specification, i.e. column (11) of Table 3 .
In the remainder of Table 4 we further explore the role played by sectoral employment. In column (2) we modify our benchmark specification (column 11 in Table 3 ) by controlling for the share of employment in manufacturing, whereas in column (3) we consider employment in the construction and retail sectors. In neither case is the sign and significance of our main explanatory variable affected. Interestingly, representatives of districts in which manufacturing is more important tend to be less favorable towards unskilled immigration, whereas the opposite is true for districts in which construction and retail play a bigger role (even though the latter effect is not statistically significant).
We turn next to consider in Table 5 several robustness checks concerning the political/ideological channel. We start by replacing, in column (1) the legislator's party affiliation, with his/her DW nominate score, where a higher score indicates that the politician is more `conservative' (see section 4 for the definition). Our results suggest that more conservative politicians are more likely to vote against pro-immigration measures, but once again the sign and significance of our main explanatory variable is hardly affected. In column
(2) the representative's ideological leaning is instead measured using the ADA score, where a higher score indicates that the politician is more liberal (see section 4 for the definition). The findings in column (2) are fairly comparable to those in column (1). In columns (3) and (4) we control respectively for whether the politician belongs to the House majority and for whether a politician in the majority belongs also to the same party as the president. In both cases, belonging to the House majority has a negative impact on the likelihood to support a liberalization in immigration policy towards the unskilled, but our main result on the role of the labor market channel are hardly affected.
So far our analysis of the drivers of an individual representative's voting behavior has focused on the role played by the characteristics of the district's average voter. At the same time, it has been widely argued that in democratic societies the aggregation of individual preferences is likely to be a much richer process. In particular, when it turns to immigration policy, a recent strand of the literature has emphasized the activities carried out by pressure groups (Facchini Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) have used a new dataset, which allows to identify the purpose of the lobbying activity to show that in the United States lobbying at the sectoral level has a statistically significant and important effect on the allocation of work and related visas across sectors. To assess the role of organized groups on the voting behavior of elected representatives unfortunately we cannot follow the same procedure, as the data used by Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) does not allow for the identification of the politician, which has been contacted by the lobby. We use instead political action committee contributionswhich are available since 1979and can be easily traced to the elected official. In particular, we focus on the role played by contributions offered by corporations (PacCorporate) and by unions (PacLabor). The presumption is that corporations will favor more lax immigration policies as more immigrants will decrease labor costs, whereas unions are against this type of policies for exactly the same reason. As Political Action Committee Contributions (PACs) measure lobbying effort on a variety of different issues, we have considered a politician to have been "influenced" for the sake of immigration policy if the corporate (labor) contributions he/she has received are at or above the eightieth percentile of all corporate (labor) contributions in that year. 27 Interestingly, neither corporate nor labor PAC contributions appear to affect the voting behavior of elected officials on immigration policy (column 5). This finding resembles a similar result in Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) , where PAC contributions are also shown not to be a significant driver of immigration policy, whereas the opposite is true for lobbying expenditure. 28 More importantly, including lobbying does not affect the sign and significance of our main results. 29
In Table 6 we consider two robustness checks on the network channel. As Latinos are by far the largest ethnic group among recent migrants in the US, we start by considering whether Hispanic congressmen behave differently from Non-Hispanic legislators, but we don't find any conclusive evidence. This result has to be treated with caution though, as the number of Hispanic representatives in Congress has been very low for the first twenty-five years of our sample, and has increased substantially only starting from the mid nineties. Finally, in column
(2) we look at whether Black congressmen behave differently from Non-Blacks on immigration issues, and we find that members of the Black congressional caucus tend to be more in favor of open immigration policies (see also the discussion in Section 5).
Finally, in table 7 we carry out a series of robustness checks involving the geography of immigration and changes in the sample size. In column (1) we carry out our analysis focusing only on the four major immigration reforms (H.R.3810, H.R.2202, H.R.4300, and H.R.4437 .
In column (2), we restrict our sample to the voting behavior of congressmen from the Sunbelt states, which are characterized by strong population growth during the decades we are considering. Finally, in column (3), we focus instead on legislators belonging to states which received large inflows of immigrants (the 15 states with the highest share of foreign-born in the population during our observation period). In all these cases our main results are not affected, i.e. the expected effect of immigration on the district's labor market is a key determinant in the representative's voting behavior.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a simple theoretical model to analyze the drivers of the voting behavior of individual representatives on immigration policy, which emphasizes the role played by the skill composition of the constituency. Our model predicts that legislators will be more (less) likely to favor a policy increasing the number of unskilled (skilled) immigrants, the more skilled labor abundant is their district.
We have assessed the predictions of our model on a novel dataset, which includes all US House of Representatives voting records on immigration policy over the period 1970-2006.
We have found that labor market factors, as captured by the complementarity /substitutability between the domestic and foreign labor force are key drivers of congressmen voting behavior.
Representatives from more skilled labor abundant districts are systematically more likely to support an unskilled immigration liberalization bill, while representatives from more unskilled labor abundant districts are less likely to do so. This result is remarkably robust and continues to hold when we control for a wealth of additional economic and non-economic drivers.
As for future work, we plan to use the rich dataset we have constructed to investigate the voting behavior of elected politicians on different aspects of globalization. For instance, a simple economic Heckscher-Ohlin model would suggest that international trade and international factor mobility should be substitutes from the point of view of the labor market effects, since international trade in goods can effectively be thought as the purchase of embodied factor services. We plan to investigate whether this simple prediction holds in the data, i.e. whether given district economic characteristics a politician will vote in the same way on a measure increasing the supply of unskilled labor as he votes on a trade bill alleviating the 24 import of labor-intensive products. We believe that answering these questions will greatly increase our understanding of the political economy of globalization. Cong and Date describe the congress/date in which/when the vote took place. Bill shows the name under which the bill is originating in the House of Representatives ("H.R."). Major immigration legislations are marked with an asterisk (*). Topic classifies the broad issue of the bill. Keyword provides some basic information about the content of the legislation. Direction shows whether the bill is pro or contra liberalizing immigration. Yes/No show the overall number of Yes/No Votes. 
